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Do Yugoslavia's channels and pattern of "soft  Yugoslavia's channels of redistribution differ
budget" redistribution differ from those docu-  significantly from those in other socialist econo-
mented for other Eastern European economies?  mies, the redistribution shares a common driving
After all, Yugoslavia's  self-management system  force - the pursuit of job and wage security.
has been regarded as a "third way," a system  Producers of energy, food, and heavy manufac-
fundamentally different from those of other  tures, as well as less developed regions, have
socialist economies. The workers' roles as  especially benefited from the redistribution.
decisionmakers and as claimants of firms'
residual income are inconsistent with the concept  This analysis for Yugoslavia suggests an
of state paternalism implied in soft budget  important lesson for the process of transition in
redistribution.  Eastern European economies. As the economy
decentralizes (with decisionmaking shifting to
Kraft and Vodopivec show that Yugoslav  local governments and enterprises), powerful
finns have also been subjected to massive,  coalitions emerge that represent special interests,
pervasive redistribution through a soft budget  and many new channels of redistribution may
constraint; in 1986, gross subsidies in manufac-  open. Where multiparty democracy is still
turing amounted to 50 percent, and net subsidies  developing and property rights are ill designed,
to 15.6 percent of GDP. In a new approach to  decentralization may thus increase, not decrease,
quantifying such redistribution, Kraft and  redistribution.
Vodopivec focus particularly on the redistribu-
tion flows produced by holding financial assets  The authors question the appropriateness of
and liabilities in an inflationary environment in  many analyses of, and conclusions drawn from,
which financial claims are generally not indexed.  the "Yugoslav experiment." Most studies of the
Analyzing firm-level data for Yugoslavia's  Yugoslav economy take for granted that any
entire manufacturing sector for 1986 show that  residual surplus of a firm accrues to thos'e who
such flows - in contrast with those of other  currently work for the firm. But evidence that
Eastern European economies - have been a far  income is massively redistributed among firms
more important source of redistribution than  casts doubts on the validity of such an assump-
formal taxes and subsidies. Although  tion and thus on the results of studies based on it.
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REFERENCES  ........................................................  22Massive redistribution of income has been a key feature of East European
socialism.  Most evident is the subsidization of consumption, especially basic
food and housing, but more subtle and pervasive redistribution results from
the phencienon of the so-called soft budget constraint,  with profitable firms
being discretionally taxed and the proceeds used to bail out unprofitable
ones.!'  Janos Kornai (1980) and others have written about the consequences
of such redistribution:  allocative inefficiency, poor  product quality, and
poor motivation for workers.
The channels and pattern of soft budget redistribution detailed for
Hungary  (Kornai and Matits 1987) and Poland (Schaffer 1990a) may be
extrapolated to other Eastern European economies, but not as obviously to
Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia's self-management system has been regarded as a third
way, a system fundamentally different from that of other socialist economies.
Yuy,oslav  workers' roles as decisionmakers and claimants of  firms' residual
income is inconsistent with the concept of state paternalism implied in soft-
budget redistribution.  Moreover, Yugoslavia has experienced significant  open
unemployment since the 1970s, an indication  that the budget constraint on the
Yugoslav firm might not have been soft enough to absorb excess labor supply,
or may not have been soft at all.V  Finally, the studies of Poland and
Hungary show direct government subsidies to have been the vehicle for
softening the firms' budget constraint;  such subsidies have been virtually
nonexistent in the Yugoslav economy for more than two decades.
The purpose of this paper is to show that Yugoslav firms have also been
subjected to massive, pervasive redistribution through a soft budget
constraint.  To quantify such redistribution, we focus particularly on the
redistributive effects of holding financial assets and liabilities in an
inflationary environment  in which financial claims are generally not indexed.
1/  Bailouts are uncommon in market democracies, but these societies are not
spared from counterproductive redistribution, above all stemming from
the collusive behavior of producers and bargaining among distributive
coalitions.  See, for example, Olson 1982.
2/  Open unemployment could also be explained by labor-management
interpretation of the Yugoslav firm, according to which insiders, as the
claimants of residual income, block the entry of outsiders.3
Analyzing firm-level data for Yugoslavia's manufacturing sector for 1986, we
show that such flows, in contrast to those of other Eastern European
economies, have been a far more important source of redistribution than taxes
and subsidies.  Although Yugoslavia's channels of redistribution differ
significantly from those in other socialist economies, they share a common
driving force: the pursuit of job and wage security.  Producers of energy,
food, and heavy manufactures, as well as less developed regions, have
particularly benefitted from the redistribution.
1. CHANNELS OF REDISTRIBUTION
To  prevent social unrest, personal earnings policies in Yugoslavia
during the 1970s and 1980s ensured job and wage security by leveling out
differences in average earnings among enterprises.  Average earnings were
leveled through a mechanism designed to control the distribution of the firm's
income.  By determining the "socially warranted" wage-bill, that part of
income the workers could take home, the mechanism restrained above-average
enterprises from paying high earnings and allowed below-average enterprises to
pay personal earnings regardless of their ability to finance the wage-bill.  A
firm with income 60 percent above the industry average, for example, could pay
only 25 percent above the industry average in personal earnings, and a firm
with income 40 percent below the industry average could pay only 19 percent
below the industry average in personal earnings  (Vodopivec 1989).
By compressing differences in personal earnings across firms, the
control of income distribution allowed income to be shifted from above-average
to below-average firms.  Basing pay on calculations of the socially warranted
wage bill meant that, after wages were paid, proportionally more income was
left in above-average than in below-average firms.  Income could then be
shifted from above-average to below-average firms, and was indeed drained away
through the many channels described below.  Below-average firms that exhausted
their income by paying out an excessive share of personal earnings relative to4
their earnings were subsidized by being exempted from taxes and similar
payments and allowed concessionary credits.
To do justice to an analysis of redistribution in the Yugoslav economy,
we must consider several nonstandard types of tax and subsidy.  Formal taxes
and subsidies are only the tip of the iceberg.  Significant redistribution
takes a less visible form in the appropriation of financial savings by means
of an inflation tax  and in compulsory financial investments with large
stipulated negative returns. 2 '  Overall taxes thus consist of formal taxes,
quasitaxes, and losses on money, while overall subsidies consist of formal
subsidies, quasisubsidies, and gains on money.  These taxes and subsidies are
described below; see Appendix 1 for their precise definition in terms of
accounting data.
1.1  Formal taxes and formal subsidies
Formal taxes and formal subsidies are pure income transfers, formally
recognized as such.  Formal taxes include republican income taxes, some other
obligations that have the nature of taxes, such as expenses for preserving the
environment and payments for social self-defense, and payments for the
provision of social services to the Self-Management Communities of Interest
(SMCIs).!' Formal subsidies are nonreimbursable resources obtained to
prevent or lessen a loss reported in the annual income statement, or to help
when such a loss has been incurred.  At least part of formal subsidies can be
used to finance personal incomes.  Sources of subsidies are other firms within
the Working Organization of Associated Labor (WOAL) and government reserve and
3/  Yugoslavia has traditionally been plagued by inflation.  Inflation rose
from about 30 percent in 1980 to full hyperinflation by the end of 1989.
4/  Self-Management Communities of Interest (SMCIs) are independent legal
entities, managed  jointly by producers and consumers, that provide
goods and services in areas where markets alone fail to do so:
services, energy and infrastructure.5
solidarity funds (Law of Associated Labor, Article 155).5' Also, some forms
of interfirm crediting, called resource pooling because the creditors
supposedly retain decision-making power over the resources lent, specify that
the creditor must help the debtor cover losses, should they occur.6'
1.2  Quasitaxes and cquasisubsidies
Quasitaxes and quasisubsidies are also income transfers but, unlike
taxes and subsidies, are not formally recognized as such.  We define
quasitaxes as complete or nearly complete appropriations of resources by one
agent that are formally accounted for as financial investments by another
agent.  That is, the resources appear on the asset side of the investor's
balance sheet, but are typically written off after some time, perhaps several
years. 2 '  To a much lesser extent, they are repaid to the investor, but only
at their face value or at a small positive nominal interest rate with a grace
period of several years, which means, with inflation, at a substantially
negative real interest rate so that in real terms, only a minute portion of
the original investment is recovered.8' Both sides clearly understand the
grant implicit in this kind of financial investment, so these investments are
clearly involuntary.  Quasisubsidies are the counterparts of quasitaxes.
5/  The Working Organization of Associated Labor (WOAL) is considered to be
Yugoslavia's closest counterpart to the Western enterprise.  It usually
consists of several sub-units called Basic Organizations of Associated
Labor  (BOALs).
6/  The opposite case, participating in the debtor's profits, rarely yields
positive real gains, since principal is usually not revalued and payment
of the profit share in Yugoslavia's highly inflationary environment
normally does not even make up for the loss of the principal.
7/  Enterprises are advised by government to accept self-management
agreements to that effect.  These agreements are supposed to serve as a
veil preserving the legality and integrity of the system despite the
involuntary and discretionary nature of the transfers.
S/  For example, the loan to the Federal Fund for the Acceleration of the
Development of Less Developed Republics and Provinces is repaid in 13
annuities, after a grace period of three years and with an interest rate
of 5 percent  (The Use of the Account Plan for an OAL, Information on
Book-Keeping  and  Profession,  1985.)6
The channels for this type of transfer are as follows:
- Credits  to  cover  losses.
- Rehabilitation  credits.
- Resource  pooling
- Investments in  davelopment funds, special governmient  funds, securities.
or SMCIs of material production. 2 '
- Investment in a WOAL's solidarity and reserve funds.
- Foreign loans to enterprises from commercial banks, to the extent that
the enterprises are relieved from exchange rate risk." 2'
- Waivers of taxes, contributions, and compulsory pooling of resources.
- Borrowing from the firm's own business fund to cover the loss;
lossmakers are, to some extent, entitled to do so."'
Most of these channels are used only selectively.  If a firm is unable
to meet its obligations without incurring a loss, the obligations are reduced,
deferred, or simply waived.  Lossmakers, and some other firms, as determined
by law, are thus exempted from, partly relieved of, or allowed to defer the
obligation  (a) to pay taxes to the republican government,  (b)  to contribute to
republican reserve and solidarity funds, and (c)  to pool resources in the
Federal Fund for Financing Less Developed Regions and SMCIs of material
production.
9/  These include natural monopolies such as electricity, oil and gas,
infrastructure including railroads, roads, ports, airports, and some
utilities such as broadcasting, telephone, mail.  They finance part of
their investment through direct "contributions" from firms in other
industries.
10/  Until recently, this was true in Yugoslavia.  Authorities allowed
exchange rate differences stemming from this type of loan (the effects
of revaluating foreign loans denominated in dinars as a result of the
depreciation of domestic currency) to be deferred and thus to be shown
on enterprises' balance sheets as an increase in assets (under "active
deferrals").  Thus, they would not appear among costs when they were
due, so only the original counterpart of a loan in dinars was translated
into costs --  creating large excess demand (see  World Bank 1989).
11/  The firm is obligeo to repay these funds in the future, but at least the
"gain-on-money" clause applies (that is, with inflation the firm repays
to its business fur.d  less in real terms than it borrows from it).7
A word about the enterprises' ability to pay.  The income-sharing nature
of personal incomes in Yugoslavia makes labor costs, at least theoretically,
very flexible.  If external obliga *.ons  and capital accumulation were given
priority, and the firm's personal income fund were treated as a residual, most
enterprises would indeed be able to meet their obligations.  Of course, the
residual left for personal incomes might be small, even dropping below the
level needed to provide a minimum standard of living.  To avoid such a
socially undesirable situation, priority is given to personal earnings, and
capital accumulation and other obligations are considered residual. The quasi-
fixed nature of personal earnings determines the amount of residual income and
thus the firm's ability to meet its obligations.
1.3  Los,es and gains on money
Quasitaxes and quasisubisdies derive from inflationary taxation of
compulsorily allocated resources.  Another redistribution, losses and gains on
money, results from inflationary taxation of voluntarily allocated resources.
Losses on money are defined as an inflation tax on voluntarily helA money
assets (assets whose values are firmly fixed in the money unit, such as cash,
debts owned by the firm, and loans given to other firms) (see Baxter 1984, 58-
78).  Obviously, gains on money are the reverse image of losses on money.
Given Yugoslavia's historical practice of holding the interest rate
significantly below the inflation rate, borrowers accrue significant gains on
money and lenders accrue losses.  So the banking system has been a significant
source of redistribution from net creditors to net debtors."'
In the empirical analysis that follows, these channels of redistribution
are quantified from the accounting data.  But other important channels of
redistribution  (not easily quantifiable,  if at all) are omitted from the
analysis.  The most important channels unaccounted for are:
12/  Thus, the Yugoslav economy has been seriously financially "repressed,"
to borrow McKinnon's terminology  (for example, McKinnon 1991).8
(a)  Implicit taxation through regulated prices." 3'
(b)  Redistribution through accounting methods:  A firm's financial reEults
also "depend" on the accountants' ability to bend rules and come wp with
a "positive zero" (a  barely positive result on the income statement), to
avoid paying taxes and quasitaxes.  This is particularly important in
Yugoslavia, where accounting rules do not allow for inflatior.,  and where
no independent auditing companies restrict firms' discretion in applying
rules.-
(c)  Eating up a firm's own capital through "deprec_.ation  of all assets in
real terms through improper or inadequate operation of the enterprise"
(Vanek 1972).
2. REDISTRIBUTION FLOWS QUANTIFIED
In this section, we quantify the flow of redistribution for Yugoslav
manufacturing, both nationally and by region and industry.
The empirical analysis is based on 1986 annual accounts of all (8,689)
Yugoslav manufacturing enterprises.  See Appendix 2 for the description of
data.  The year 1986 was chosen because data were available for it.  In
judging how generalizable the results are for the rest of the 1980s, two
considerations are particularly important.  First, everything else being
equal, redistribution flows deriving from the inflation tax are proportional
to inflation.  Inflation was steadily rising in the 1980s, see footnote 3, so,
on this count, the results overestimate redistribution flows before 1986 and
underestimate them after 1986.  Second, in response to mounting inflation, new
13/  Petrovic  (1988) suggests that the Yugoslav price system is not  much
more distorted than that of some market economies. He finds that prices
in market economies are generally within 10 percent of equilibrium
values, in Yugoslavia 13 percent, and in Poland and the Soviet Union
about 30 per^:ent.
14/  The treatment of inventories is especially deficient.  As one empirical
study shows, because of the widespread use of the FIFO accounting
method, material costs have been understated and income overstated, thus
allowing higher wage increases and adding to pressures on inflation
(Lavrac and Cibej 1986).9
accounting rules were introduced in 1987 and again in 1989 to limit
redistribution. It is doubtful, however, that the new rules were effective
(Mates 1989)..5'
2.1  How flows are calculated
Formal taxes and subsidies are calculated as the sum of appropriate
flows taken mostly from the income statement.  For quasitaxes, quasisubsidies,
and losses and gains on money, the following method is used.  Since debts in
Yugoslavia were typically not indexed in 1986, redistribution flows deriving
from holding assets (liabilities) were proportional to both inflation rate and
the average amount of asset (liabilities) held.  The redistribution flow,
RFLOW, where RFLOW could be each of the above variables, is thus calculated as
B  +  B,
RFLOW  =  INFLR  x  (1)
2
where INFLR is an inflation rate, equal to 84 percent for Yugoslavia in 1986
based on the retail price index, and B-,  and B 0 are the tax (subsidy) bases at
the end of the previous and current years, respectively.  Note that the
redistribution flows are expressed in terms of the money units at the end of
the period, and that the equilibrium real interest rate is assumed to equal
zero.  The tax (subsidy) base is the sum of the items described for various
categories (see  Appendix 1).
In calculating losses on money, the amount calculated using this formula
is reduced by the sum of interest payments received and the amount of joint
income received by participants in resource pooling.  Similarly, in
calculating gains on money, the amount calculated using this formula is
15/  It would be of great interest to trace changes in redistribution through
time, in response not only to changes in inflation and accounting rules,
but also to the changes in economic and political system their ultimate,
fundamental determinant.  Such a study seems a fruitful avenue for
future research.10
reduced by the sum of interest payments paid by the enterprise and income paid
to other enterprises as a dividend from resource pooling.16'
2.2  Redistribution for the econoMy as awhole
lable 1 shows redistribution for Yugoslav manufacturing for 1986 (see
Appendix 2 for description of data).  The variables are defined as rates that
is, as a percentage of the firm'L income.0 2'  In calculating the rates, we
corrected for differences in valuation between redistribution flows (end-of-
the-year valuation) and income (mid-year valuation) by inflating income by the
retail price increase during June and Deceraber  1986.18'
Table 1:  REDISTRIBUTION IN YUGOSLAV MANUFACTURING  IN 1986
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----
Meanb/  Coefficient of
Variablea'  (in  percentage)  variation
Formal taxes  14  2.07
Formal subsidies  1  74.67
Quasitaxes  25  8.17
Quasisubsidies  13  28.03
Losses on money  88  8.63
Gains on money  132  18.03
Net subsidies7/  18  37.88
-------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----
a/  Variables are defined as rates, that is, the firms' redistributive
flows as a percentage or  the firms' income.
b/  Income-weighted mean.
c/  Defined as the difference between the sum of subsidy rates and the sum
of tax rates.
16/  Generally in the 1980s the discrepancy between the inflation rate and
the dinar depreciation rate was insignificant, but this was not true in
1986.  In 1986, even money liabilities (assets) denominated in foreign
exchange could bring gains (losses) on money.  But this type of gain
(loss) is atypical and unpredictable, so it has been ignored.
17/  The firm's income cor:esponds to the firm's net value added-it is the
difference between the firms' revenues and costs.  Costs include
depreciation, but not wages.
18/  Mid-year valuation of income assumes that prices in 1986 were increasing
linearly, and that firms' revenues and costs were distributed equally
over the year. We are grateful to Neven Mates for pointing out to us the
problem of differences in the evaluation of redistributive flows and
income.11
Table 1 substantiates our claim that formal taxes and subsidies
constitute only a minor component of redistribution; indeed, formal subsidies
are a negligible one percent of income.  Much more sizable are quasitaxes,
quasisubsidies, and especially gains and losses on money.
Redistributive rates vary substantially.  Most enterprises receive no
formal subsidies since these are distributed to the lossmakers, and some of
whom receive heavy subsidies, so formal subsidies vary much more than any
other redistributive flow.  Other subsidies, quasisubsidies and gains on
money, also vary greatly, more than any tax variables.  Subsidies are
obviously directed more narrowly, and thus distributed more discretionally,
than taxes, although formal taxes vary significantly enough to suggest that
they are also discretionary.
Total gross subsidies in manufacturing amounted to a staggering 58
percent of income or 50 percent of GDP.19' Manufacturing was, admittedly,
one of the most heavily subsidized sectors, but the Yugoslav economy as a
whole was probably one of the most heavily subsidized Eastern European
economies.  Schaffer (1990b) estimates direct Polish subsidies to be 14
percent of GDP, for example, and reports that Gomulka estimates subsidies
arising from soft credits to be of a similar order of magnitude.  Needless to
say, both Yugoslav and Polish subsidies substantially exceed those in Western
Europe, which range from 1.3 to 6 percent of GDP  (European Community 1989).
Looking now at the net effect of redistribution, the sum of subsidies
minus the sum of taxes, as reflected in the variable net subsidy in table 1,
the manufacturing sector as a whole turns out to be a net beneficiary of
redistribution.  Net subsidies amount to 18 percent of income or 15.6 percent
of GDP; money gains alone, in fact, exceed the sum of all three components of
taxes.  This is certainly a sizable transfer:  we estimate pre-tax profits to
be 43 percent of income, so net subsidies add on 42 percent to profits.N'
That the manufacturing sector is a net beneficiary of redistribution is
surprising.  For one thincs,  enterprises in Lugoslavia are taxed quite heavily,
partly because many social services in Yugoslavia are financed from enterprise
taxes.  Moreover, manufacturing's share in total Gross Material Product in
1986 was 43 percent, so the question arises, where did subsidy resources come
from.  In particular, if one  assumes that other sectors besides manufacturing
were subsidized.
19/  Because of the inherent interdependence between money losses and money
gains, we only consider net money gains in calculating gross subsidies.
20/  No definition of profits existed in Yugoslav accountina in 1986. Pre-tax
profits are defined here as income minus wage payments. This corresponds
to the Yugoslav notion of surplus of production (visak proizvodnje).12
Two facts are important in explaining the source of the subsidies.
First, private businesses, as well as sectors in which prices were not
controlled, were net taxpayers.  Second, and more important, as several
studies point out, in the 1980s, Yugoslavia's commercial banks ran significant
deficits that later showed up as a deficit of the National Bank of Yugoslavia,
that is, as a public debt (see  Bole and Gaspari 1989). Ultimately, the
household sector financed the subsidies through the inflation tax.
2.3  Redistribution by reQions2-'
The less-developed regions (LDRs)  of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, were the main beneficiaries of
redistribution.  The main source of redistribution was subsidized credits, as
shown by large net money gains of LDRs manufacturers  (see  table 2, column 1).
Aided by transfers from the Fund for Development of Less-Developed Regions,
LDRs were also able to levy much  lighter taxes and quasitaxes on their
enterprises than the more-developed regions (MDRs).  Looking at the overall
redistribution, net subsidies for LDR manufacturing amounted to 57 percent of
LDR's income from manufacturing; and net subsidies for Montenegro's and
Kosovo's manufacturing considerably exceeded the two regions's income from
manufacturing.  The enterprises of only one region, Slovenia, were net tax-
payers.
Table 2:  REDISTRIBUTION BY REPUBLIC AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCEA/ (as a %)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ __---__----------
Formal  Formal  Quasi-  Quasi-  Losses on  Gains on  Net
taxes  subsidies  taxes  subsidies money  money  subsidiest'
--------------------------------------------------------- __------------------__----------
Yugoslavia  14  1  25  13  88  132  18
Less-developed  9  1  19  12  105  177  57
regions
Bosnia  9  1  21  11  118  178  43
Montenegro  8  1  18  15  104  236  123
Macedonia  11  0  17  13  86  135  35
Kosovo  8  0  15  15  68  220  145
More-developed  16  1  27  13  83  117  5
regions
Croatia  15  1  32  10  86  136  13
Slovenia  17  0  23  24  77  83  -11
Serbia !/  16  1  25  9  84  125  10
---------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----__---------
a/  Income-weighted mean of firms' rates (the firms' redistributive flows
as a percentage of the firms' income).
b/  Defined as the difference between the sum of subsidy rates and the sum of tax rates.
c/  A defect in the data base made it impossible to distinguish Vojvodina from
Serbia proper.  The two are listed as "Serbia" here.
21/  We refer to Yugoslavia's republics and autonomous provinces as regions.13
The heavy subsidy of LDRs suggests a Gerschenkronian interpretation, the
government-mediated transfer of capital to fight backwardness  (Gerschenkron
1962). The less-developed regions appear to be using fiscal policy and bank
credits to promote and direct industrial development.
Even though the data allow us to determine only the recipients, not the
donors of net subsidies, the data suggest that transfers from richer to poorer
regions well exceeded the ones mandated by law of 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP for
the more developed regions.  The most important source of subsidies was net
money gains and such gains were financed by taxing the population at large.
Even if one assumes that taxes were spread evenly across republics, thus
ignoring direct transfers  from more-developed to less-developed regions, the
more-developed regions turn out to be net taxpayers, at 13 percent, and the
less-developed regions net beneficiaries, at 40 percent, substantially above
the rate that would be generated through mandated transfers.-2
More-developed regions have always looked upon development transfers as
a burden, so it is surprising that actual redistribution exceeds what is
mandated.  There are two reasons this is so.  First, such subsidies are the
outcome of the federation yielding to the LDRs' pressures to make up for both
enterprise losses and local government deficits.  Second, Yugoslavia's
development plan for LDRs has historically favored capital-intensive
industries.  That plan was backed with concessionary credits and direct
investments by firms from MDRs.3'
2.4  Redistribution by industries
Net subsidies also differ widely across industries (table 3).  In the
food sector, in heavy manufacturing, and particularly in the energy sector,
subsidies exceeded taxes; only light manufacturing was a net taxpayer.24'
Such a pattern of subsidization reflects a conscious price policy: prices of
energy and food were kept low to stimulate consumption, energy  producers were
22/  That rate would be about 5 to 6 percent.  The GMP of less-developed
regions was about one-third of that of the more-developed regions in
1986.
23/  To offset the policy of cheap credits, LDRs' prices might have been
depressed, as often argued in the Yugoslav political arena but no
convincing evidence has been advanced on either side.
24/  We define the sectors as follows: energy includes industries 101 to 105
(electric power to oil processing in table 3); food industries 130, 131
and 132 (food processing, drink, and meat); heavy industry sectors 106
to 119 (from iron ore refining to chemical processing); and light
industry from 120 to 139 (from stone and gravel to other), excluding
food sectors 130 to 132.14
compensated through direct contribitions by enterprises; and the emphasis on
heavy manufacturing can be traced back to Lenin.
3. DETERMINANTS OF REDISTRIBUTION
What are the driving forces behind such variable taxation and
subsidization across enterprises?  The most significant factor is the quest
for job and wage security.21' As we shall show, (1)  redistribution  levels
out differences in income per worker among enterprises, and (2) net subsidies
per worker are negatively related to income per worker and positively to
capital per worker.  Additional factors of redistribution particularly helped
firms in less-developed regions.
3.1  The link between the pre- and post-redistribution income per worker
A useful tool for exploring the redistribution of income among
enterprises  is a cross-tabulation matrix that links the ranking of enterprises
according to their pre-redistribution income per worker to the ranking of
enterprises according to their post-redistribution per worker  (table 4).  If
subsidies were uniform and thus neutral, the cross-tabulation matrix would be
the unit matrix.
Redistribution in Yugoslav manufacturing is profoundly non-neutral, in
37.8 percent of enterprises, the original income category changes after
redistribution is accounted for, with the overall effect of leveling out
differences in income per worker among enterprises.  After redistribution,
there are no enterprises with negative income per worker, as opposed to 12.5
percent of the enterprises before redistribution.  Moreover, more than half
the enterprises that originally showed negative income per worker jump even
into the medium- or high-income category after redistribution.  Similarly,
fewer than half of the enterprises with high income per worker remain in the
same category after redistribution.  Only in low- and medium-income categories
do the majority of enterprises remain in their respective categories.>'
Another way to see the effects of redistribution is to plot actual post-
redistribution and recalculated pre-redistribution income per worker (figure
1). For easier comparison, we added a lump-sum subsidy to the recalculated
income to make the mean of recalculated income per worker coincide with the
25/  In a public-choice analysis of the redistribution in reforming socialist
economies; viewing redistribution as a confrontation between
distributive coalitions, Vodopivec  (1991) reached the same conclusion.
26/  These findings echo Schaffer (1990a). The reason for the main difference
all Polish high-income enterprises remain in that category after
redistribution, and only 42.5 percent do so in our case is that Schaffer
does not include taxes.15
mean of actual income per worker.  Like the cross-tabulation table, Figure 1
shows that redistribution compresses differences in enterprises' income per
worker.27' The actual distribution is much narrower than the one
recalculated, and has a much higher peak.  The standard deviation of the
actual distribution is only 30 percent of the standard deviation of the
recalculated distribution (see Annex Figure 1).
3.2  Econometric analysis
To hypothesize about the determinants of redistribution, one must look
at the institutions in place in Yugoslavia in 1986, above all, at the control
mechanism for personal earnings.  The firm's socially warranted personal
earnings fund was determined by comparing the firm's actual income with the
prescribed norm for income as determined, above all, through industry-specific
norms for average wages.>' If actual income exceeded the norm, the firm was
allowed to pay above-average wages, but a fraction of the excess income was
taxed. If actual income fell short of the norm, the firm had to pay below
average wages, but, compared with firms with income above the norm, its wage
bill could exhaust a larger share of the firm's income.  That is, the firm
effectively received a subsidy amounting to a fraction of the shortfall in
income.  A firm's net subsidy function can be specified as follows:
S  =  a(Yn  - Y)  (1)
where S is the firm's net subsidies, overall taxes minus overall subsidies),
Y"  is its norm for income, Y is its income, and a is a fraction of income to
be taxed (subsidized). Furthermore, as the control mechanism stipulates, yn
Nw',  N is number of workers in the firm, and wn is a norm for average wages,
so (1) can be transformed to an empirically estimable form:
S/N =  c - a(Y/N)  (2)
where c = awn.
27/  Redistribution shows similar effects in terms of original and post-
redistribution profitability in Hungary (Kornai and Matits 1987).
28/  See,  for  example,  Official  Gazette  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of
Slovenia,  No. 20, 1987.  Norms for average wages were assessed by a
special body representing the republic's government and other political
and economic agents, the Committee of Participants of the Social Compact
on Income Distribution.16
A caveat is in order on the theoretically admissible range for the
parameter a fraction of the income taxed or subsidized.  Were the actual
income Y free of any components of redistribution, such a range would
evidently be an open interval (0,1).  The data for Y, however, are already
contaminated by some redistribution, notably, money gains on credits for fixed
assets, so the range for a extends beyond 1.2'
We also hypothesize that net subsidies depend on capital intensity.  In
the 1980s, there was little self-financing of Yugoslav firms; rather, firms
usually financed a substantial part of their investment with outside credits
(Gaspari 1991).  Under the circumstances, more capital-intensive firms were
more likely to receive net subsidies through both bank credits and the pooling
of resources with other firms.
Finally, to allow for possible regional differences, we also included in
the regression regional dummies.  The region omitted was Slovenia, the region
with the smallest net subsidy (see table 2), so the sign on regional dummies
is expected to be positive.
The results of regressing net subsidy per worker on firm's income per
worker, capital intensity, and a regional dummy confirm our hypotheses about
the forces of redistribution  (table 5; see Appendix 2 for the definition of
variables)."  Except in four cases the coefficients of income per worker
are all significant and the implied taxation rates, the negative values of the
coefficients of income, are in the theoretically permissible range. Somewhat
weaker is the evidence on the effects of capital intensity; still, the
predicted positive value of that parameter was obtained in 22 out of 27
industries, 10 of which were statistically significant at 5 percent.  Finally,
the predominantly positive regional dummies, most of them for less-developed
29/  If a 1 and a2 are the parameters obtained from (2) under the assumption
that Y is income before and after redistribution, respectively, then a2
=  al/(1-aj)
30/  Twenty seven industries at the 5-digit level with at least 85
organizations were selected total of 4323 units, 50 percent of the
larger sample studied above.17
regions, show that forces unaccounted for by the above two variables favored
less-developed regions.  These were probably political forces, aiming both at
financing enterprises' losses and government spending and at promoting the
development of less-developed regions (Annex Table 3).
4. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Redistribution of income in Yugoslavia was pervasive and massive, with
gross subsidies in manufacturing of 50 percent, and net subsidies of 15.6
percent of GDP.  Channels of redistribution differed significantly from those
in other Eastern European countries, but we found a similar driving force
behind redistribution:  the pursuit of job and wage security.  Determinants of
redistribution included a firm's capital intensity and the promotion of less-
developed regions.
This analysis for Yugoslavia suggests an important lesson for the
process of transition in Eastern European economies.  As the economy
decentralizes, with decisionmaking shifting to local governments and
enterprises, powerful coalitions emerge that represent special interests, and
many new channels of redistribution may open.  Where multiparty democracy  is
still developing and property rights are ill-designed, decentralization may
thus increase, not decrease redistribution a possibility called the
decentralization trap (Klaus 1990).
Policy advisors for economies in transition often grossly overestimate a
government's ability to exert monetary and fiscal discipline.  Of course,
introducing modern taxation, of value added and personal earnings, for
example, better tax collection through an internal revenue service, and the
overhaul of the banking sector would help achieve such discipline, but the
disentangling the Gordian knot of government, banks, and firms remains a
problem during the transition, a problem that will disappear only with deep
structural economic changes including clarification of property rights and the
development of a democratic political system.18
Based on the findings of the paper, we must also seriously question the
appropriateness of many analyses of, and conclusions drawn from, the Yugoslav
experiment.  Most studies of the Yugoslav economy take for granted that
*"[w]orkers  have nontradable claims on the year-by-year residual cash flows
contingent on employment"  (Jensen and Meckling 1979, p. 482, and other the
studies in the Illyrian vein, for example).  Evidence that income is massively
redistributed among firms casts doubts on the validity of such an assumption
and thus on results of the studies based on it (for  example, Hinds 1991).19
APPENDIX 1: HOW REDISTRIBUTIVE FLOWS ARE CALCULATED
Formal taxes
Formal taxes are calculated as the sum of the following items from the
income statement:
- Obligations to BOALs providing services in education, science and culture,
health, social security, other social services determined by law, pension
and disability  insurance.
- Obligations for housing solidarity.
- Obligations for employment and social security of workers.
- Republican  income  tax.
- Expenses for maintaining and improving the environment.
- Memberships.
- Expenses for national defense and social self-protection.
- Contributions for Economic Chambers and other professional organizations.
- other obligations  from income.
- Part of the income for other specific purposes.
- Monopoly part of income transferred to other enterprises.
- Part of the net operating income used to cover the losses of other BOALs.
- Part of net operating income for other purposes.
- Part of net operating income for other funds.
Formal subsidies
Formal subsidies are calculated as the sum of the following items (all
memorandum items on the income statement, except "coverage of the loss
from previous years," which is taken from the "special accounting data set"):
- Coverage of losses from the fund for joint reserves of sister BOALs.
- Coverage of losses from common risk-bearing within a WOAL.
- Coverage of losses from other sources of a nonreimbursable nature.
- Coverage of losses from resource pooling.
- Coverage of losses from previous years (received in the current year) by
nonreimbursable resources, and debt write-offs incurred to cover losses from
previous years.
Quasitaxes
A quasitax base is calculated as the sum of the following items from the
asset side of the balance sheet:
Claims within a WOAL
- Coverage of the losses of other BOALs.
- Rehabilitation  credits.
- Short-term and long-term resource pooling.
Short-term lending
- Purchase  of  securities.
- Resource pooling with other firms.
- Resource pooling in the internal bank.
Long-term lending
- Pooling  with  other  firms.
- Pooling in the SMCIs of  material production.
- Resource pooling in the internal bank.
- Resource  pooling  in banks.
- Resource pooling with firms from the less-developed regions.
- Resource pooling with other social agents.
- Pooling in the development fund of the sociopolitical community.
- Long-term rehabilitation credits.
- Lending to the Federal Fund for Acceleration of the Development of Less
Developed Regions.
- Lending according to the regulations of sociopolitical communities.
- Purchase of securities and other long-term lending.20
Financial  investment  in reserve  and  solidarity  funds
- Claims  for  resources  pooled  in the  fund  for  joint  reserves  of  the WOAL.
- Claims  for  resources  pooled  in the  fund  for  joint  reserves  of
Sociopolitical  Communities.
- Claims  for  rehabilitation  credits  from  the  reserve  fund.
- Purchase  of  securities  and other  lending  from  the  reserve  fund.
- Claims  for  pooling  of  resources  from  the  solidarity  fund.
Quasisubsidies
A quasisubsidy  base  is calculated  as the  sum  of the  following
liabilities:
- Liabilities  for  the  part  of  the  business  fund  to cover  losses.
- Liabilities  from  long-term  pooling  (with  other  BOALs,  in the  SMCIs  of
material  production,  with  banks,  other  social  agents,  farmers,  and  private
persons).
Short-term  liabilities
- For  long-term  rehabilitation  credits.
- For  short-term  rehabilitation  credits.
- For  underpaid  income  taxes.
- For  underpaid  contributions  based  on  income.
- For  other  underpaid  obligations  based  on  income.
- For  taxes  on  personal  incomes.
- For  contributions  based  on personal  income.
- For  resources  lent  to  cover  losses  during  the  year  within  a WOAL.
- For  rehabilitation  credits  within  a WOAL.
Liabilities  from  the  reserve  fund
- To other  firms.
- Other  liabilities.
Liabilities  from  the  solidarity  fund  and  the  fund  for  other  purposes
- Liabilities  for the  resources  of the  solidarity  funds  lent  by other  firms.
- Other  liabilities  from  the  solidarity  fund.
- Liabilities  for the  resources  for  other  purposes  lent  by other  firms.
- Other  liabilities  for  the  resources  for other  purposes.
Losses  on money
The  sum  of  the  following  assets  is the  base  used  to calculate  losses  on
money:
- Money  assets.
- Securities  (checks,  promissory  notes,  bonds,  other).
- Claims  on the  basis  of business  relations.
- Claims  on the  basis  of  income.
- Claims  within  a WOAL.
- Paid  obligations  from  income.
- (Short-term  and  long-term)  lending.
- Money  assets  held  for  investment  purposes.
- Claims  for  advances  of  investments.
- Reserve  fund  assets.
- Assets  of  the  solidarity  fund  and  assets  for  other  purposes.
Collective  consumption  assets
- Money  assets.
- Financial  assets  pooled  in the  SMCIs  for housing.
- Pooled  resources  for  housing  within  a WOAL.
- Other  lending  from  resources  earmarked  for housing.
- Claims  from  resources  earmarked  for  housing.21
Assets earmarked for other needs of collective consumption
- Money  assets.
- Pooled resources for other needs within a WOAL.
- Pooled resources for other needs.
- Other lending from resources earmarked for other needs.
- Money assets held on giro account.
- Claims from resources earmarked for other needs.
The reduction of losses on money mentioned in the text  (returns  on the
above financial investments) is calculated as the sum of interest revenues,
revenues from participating in joint bank income, and revenues from
participating in the joint income of other enterprises, minus expenses for
covering the loss of other enterprises as  stipulated in the agreement on
resource pooling.
Gains on money
The sum of the following liabilities is used as the base for calculating
gains on money:
- Long-term  credits.
- Short-term  credits.
- Liabilities for short-term pooled resources.
- Liabilities from business relations, except liabilities to workers,
- Liabilities on income, except for distributed net income for personal
incomes.
- Liabilities for taxes and contributions.
- Liabilities  within  a WOAL.
- Liabilities for pooled solidarity resources.
- Liabilities for other solidarity resources.
- Liabilities for pooled resources for housing.
- Liabilities for loans earmarked for housing.
- Other liabilities for resources earmarked for housing.
- Liabilities for pooled resources for other needs of collective consumption.
- Liabilities from loans for resources for other needs of collective
consumption.
- Other liabilities for resources earmarked for other needs of collective
consumption.
- Other sources of resources earmarked for other needs of collective
consumption.
The reduction of gains on money (interest payments on the above financial
investments) is calculated as the sum  of interest payments for credits for
working capital, interest payments for credits for fixed assets, payments  of
dividends to other enterprises, and payments of dividends to foreign persons.22
APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND VARIABLES
Empirical analysis is based on income statements and balance sheets of
all (8,689)  Yugoslav manufacturing enterprises, obtained from the Public
Accounting Office of Yugoslavia. The units included in the empirical analysis
are both Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOALs) and so-called Uniform
Working Organizations  (enterprises that do not consist of BOALs).
The variables used in econometric analysis are defined as follows:
NET SUBSIDIES  - the difference between overall subsidies and overall
taxes (see  Appendix 1);
INCOME  - net value-added (revenues minus material costs, with
depreciation included in material costs);
CAPITAL  - present value of fixed assets;
WORKER  - yearly average of the end-of-the-month number of
workers.23
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No.  7869-YU,  1989.Annex  Table  1:  Net  Subsidies  by  Industry
Income-Weighted  Average
Industry  [lo.  of Units  Net  subsidy  Rate
6  (as a percentage)
Energy  640  104
Electricity  465  155
Coal  mining  139  17
Coal  processing  10  -37
Oil  Droduction  2  -172
Oil  refininrg  24  310
Heavy  Manufacture  3617  12
Iron  ore  mining  14  102
Iron  and  steel  '56  56
Nonferrous  ore  mining  66  93
Nonferrous  metal  production  43  134
Nonferrous  metal  processing  47  -7
Nonmetallic  minerals  production  85  -10
Nonmetallic  minerals  processing  165  0
Metalworking  '003  0
Machine-building  497  -6
Transport  equipment  282  18
shipbuilding  105  42
Electrical  machines  and  equipment  515  -12
Production  of chemicals  205  37
Processing  of  chemicals  434  -25
Light  Manufacture  3411  -7
|Stone and gravel  130  0
Building  materials  340  22
sawmills  287  -7
Furniture  583  17
Paper  166  15
Yarn  and  fabrics  296  -11
Textile  products  706  -16
Fur and  leather  68  -07
Leather  footwear  and  aoods  228  -24
Rubber  88  -33
Tobacco  94_  17
Printing  307  -27
Recycling  60  -37
Other  58  -1
Food  Sector  1021  29
Food  products  '78  |  29
|  Beverages  188  20
Animal  feeds  55  77Annex  Table  2:  The  Cross  Tabulation  Matrix
Income  Income  Per  Worker  After  Subsidies
per  worker  Negative  Low  -ncome  Medium  High  Row
before  subsidies  Income  (0-660)  Income  Income  total
____  ______________  (660-2260)  (2260-)
Negative  Income  0  376  471  114  961
0.0%  39.1%  49.0%  11.8%  12.5%
Low  Income  0  597  581  11  1189
(0-568)  0.0%  50.2%  48.8%  0.9%  13.7%
Medium  Income  0  340  3800  46  4186
(568-1901)  0.0%  8.0%  89.0%  1.1%  48.3%
High  Income  0  2  1339  995  2336
(1901-)  0.0%  15.0%  71.0%  13.0%  100.0%Annex  Table  3:  ESTIMATES  OF  THE  INTERFIRM  TRANSFER  FUNCTION'
…-------------…
Industry  COMMON  INCOMEI  CAPITAL/  REGIONAL  R 2
INTERCEPTb  WORKER  WORKER  INTERCEPTSc
…--  - - - - - - - - --  - - - - - - - - - ----  …  -------- …--  - --  - - -
Electric  power  532.63  -. 76**  .03  K 1595.15+  .18
distribution  (1.20)  (-6.35)  (.20)  (1.67)
Drawn  and rolled  -2265.73**  .28  .47*  K 1247.56+  .23









Cast metal  256.65  -.49**  .41**  K 1679.98*  .68







Tools  41.53  -. 37**  .09  K 3212.50**  .18
(.18)  (-4.77)  (.38)  (2.86)
MA 930.00*
(2.08)
Metal  construc-  274.43+  -.27**  .19  MA 730.82*  .12
tion elements  (1.84)  (-4.26)  (1.04)  (2.44,
Metal  732.59**  -. 49**  -.38  MO 3529.34**  *44
furniture  (3.53)  (-9.09)  (-.88)  (3.44)
and appliances
Specialized  1311.11**  -. 73**  -. 16  CR 913.24*  .46
industrial  (6.92)  (-12.00)  (-.49)  (-2.08)
machines  SR 949.15+
(-1.88)
Vehicle  parts  2352.54**  -1.65**  .64**  .85
(7.18)  (-21.81)  (3.69)ANNEX  TABLE  3:  continued
Electric  -369.86  -.09  .47  K 728.05*  .09









Chemical  750.88  -.44*  .62**  .22
production  (.50)  (2.12)  (4.79)
Processing  of  -413.11*  -.26**  .80**  K  1872.94**  .37











Disinfectants,  647.74  -.51**  -.17  .50
explosives  and  (1.45)  (-7.37)  (-.54)
other  chemicals
Stones  261.50  -.39**  .36  .09
(.54)  (-3.56)  (1.47)
Production  of  379.25*  -.5g**  .59**  .26
bricks  (2.55)  (-5.23)  (3.41)
Manufacture  263.55  -.39*  .89+  K  1390.01**  .16
of  building  (.91)  (-2.11)  (1.97)  (2.84)
materials
Sawmilling  424.28+  -.85**  .34+  MO  955.38*  .38
(1.82)  (-8.33)  (1.93)  (2.07)
CR 803.43*
(2.25)
Furniture  281.94**  -.37**  -.02  BO  622.50**  .18
(2.63)  (-6.48)  (-.13)  (2.99)
CR  551.28**
(2.61)ANNEX  TABLE  3:  continued
Production  of  301.46  -. 33  -. 33  MA 2604.77**  .10
construction  (.65)  (-1.03)  (-.57)  (3.83)
elements
Manufacture  500.86+  -.69**  .06  .37
of  cotton  (1.92)  (-5.69)  (938)
fabrics
Knitwear  -7.24  -. 52**  .21  SR  324.56**  .42





Garment  381.90**  -. 57**  .44**  MO 784.60**  .46
(4e74)  (-11.51)  (4.60)  (2.93)
CR  253.12*
(-2.27)
Footwear  160.00+  -. 49**  v42**  K  569.26*  .43







Wheat  Flour  1412.52**  -. 21  .67*  CR 543.74*  .03





Bread  and  531.83**  -. 59**  .32**  K  1142.70*  .41
baked  goods  (2.81)  (-6.30)  (3.63)  (2.44)
Vegetable  and  638.12  -.55*  .72  MA 2269.07*  .19
fruit  processing  (1.18)  (-2.58)  (1.48)  (2.34)
BO  2086.07**
(2.66)
Slaughtering  1598.02**  -1.15**  .66  CR  918.32+  .30
(4.24)  (-6.37)  (1.46)  (-1.91)
Printing  359.96**  -. 65*  .27+  MO 741.06*  .49
(3.43)  (-14.39)  (1.91)  (2.04)
BO 572.46*
(2.00)
…-------------------------------------------------------------------__ANNEX  TABLE  3: continued
a  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  + denotes  significant  at 10%
* significant  at 5%, and  ** significant  at 1%.
b  Common  intercept  is Slovenia  plus any regions  not  listed  under
regional  intercepts.
c  For the  regional  intercepts,  BO=Bosnia-HercegOvilna,  CR=Croatia,
K=Kosovo,  MA=Macedonia,  MO=Montenegro,  SR=Serbia  proper  plus  Vojvodina.
The t-statistics  in this column  apply to the  intercept  dummy  rather  than
the regional  intercept  per se. Hence,  a negative  sign on the  t-statistic
means  that the regional  intercept  is smaller than  the common  intercept
(but still  possibly  positive).Figure  1: ActLual  and  Recalculated  Income  per  Head
for  Yugoslavia,  1986
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